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Summary and Conclusions
Progressive development of wireless technology in recent years has enabled it to span its appli-
cation to a wide verity of systems. Simple house hold monitoring and monitoring of a patient in
a hospital gives two diverse examples of these systems. Recently wireless sensor networks (WSN)
are suggested as an alternative for safety monitoring subsystem in safety instrumented systems
(SISs). SISs have an important role in safety barriers management where each SIS is assigned to
one or more safety integrity functions (SIFs). The added wireless feature to the SISs may create
uncertainties concerning their field performance. It is therefore necessary to develop methods
to assess the reliability and safety integrity level (SIL) of SIFs in an adequate, sufficiently accurate
and practical way.
To identify and analyze the failures of wireless SIS, failure modes, effects and criticality anal-
ysis (FMECA) method is suggested. FMECA can reveal changes in underlying failure causes of
the system by comparing the wired and wireless sensors in a table. It is observed that the main
reason behind the failure of WSNs is due to the packet-loss. It is therefore reasonable to focus on
the packet-loss rate and the unavailability of SIS for the reliability assessment purpose. Packet
loss between two nodes can occur due to two main failure categories: (i) hardware failure such
as battery, memory. (ii) environmental factors such as channel occupation, interference.
Since a WSN functions in different operational modes, it can be modeled as a multi-state
system i.e. the system with multiple possible states rather than being limited only to working
and fail states. Different states in the system are because of different quality of service (QoS)
over time. The data packet-loss rate and time latency are the relevant indicators for the network
performance as they are dynamic over time and monitor different levels of QoS in the system.
Accordingly, in this study, it is suggested to apply Markov method for WSN modeling. By doing
so, we aim at utilizing the Markov method’s potential in modeling dynamic and multi-state sys-
tems. The suggested model considers the whole group of sensors as a single block with different
states.
WSNs are by nature complex structures but the proposed model is required to be simple
in order to be practical. Therefore, this study first simplifies the WSN and then proposes the
model for the simplified structure. On the other hand, the complexity of the model and mod-
iv
eling should be understandable and feasible such that the verification of the SIS performance
become straightforward and sufficiently accurate for safety applications.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Progressive development of wireless technology in recent years has enabled it to span its appli-
cation to a wide verity of systems. Simple house hold monitoring and monitoring of a patient in
a hospital gives two diverse examples of these systems (Yick et al., 2008). Recently wireless sen-
sor networks (WSN) are suggested as an alternative for safety monitoring of safety instrumented
systems (SIS) . However, the performance for such systems needs to be analyzed before imple-
menting WSNs for critical applications. Due to the change in the communication medium for
sensors, it is important to provide a practical and accurate method which can assess the relia-
bility of wireless safety systems according to standards and requirements.
SIS has an important role in management of safety barriers where each SIS is assigned to one
or more safety integrity functions (SIFs). Those functions are designed in order to mitigate the
consequences of events and put equipment under control into a safe state. Recently by advance-
ment in technology, SISs are developed to be more reliable and cost effective. These systems
may have complexities and new technical features which can create uncertainties concerning
their field performance. It is therefore necessary to develop methods to assess the reliability and
safety integrity level (SIL) of SIS in an adequate, sufficiently accurate and practical way (Brissaud
et al., 2010).
As the new trend in utilizing wireless technology has grown significantly in the last years,
SINTEF has also started investigating different applications of this technology. Accordingly, the
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foundation of this thesis is based on a project by SINTEF which studies the application of wire-
less technology in safety monitoring. This thesis is a continuation and completion of my sum-
mer project at SINTEF. My summer project report was a part of the on-going PDS Petromaks
project at SINTEF and contributed to fulfill the objective of the third task; i.e. evaluate how the
effect of new technology may influence barrier management, and the availability/reliability of
the safety barriers in particular.
1.2 Objectives
The main objectives of this Master’s project are;
1. Identifying the unique features in the wireless safety-instrumented systems
2. Investigating different failure modes
3. Determining failures of the interest in the reliability analysis
4. Determining relevant measures for reliability analysis
5. Present a method which is able to calculate the probability of failure and provide the per-
formance level
6. Model a case to exemplify the presented method
1.3 Limitation
The main goal of this project is to provide a methodology for reliability analysis of wireless SISs.
However, time and resource constrains confined the scope of this research. Following items list
the main limitations of the current study:
• The main focus point of this study is limited to the WSN sub-system of the wireless SIS
and other subsystems are not considered.
• (Norsok S-001, 2008) combined with customer regulation is chosen as the required safety
specification and other regulations is not investigated.
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• for modeling and qualitative analysis of the system the scope is confined to Markov and
FMECA while other methods are skipped in this study.
• Markov modeling is executed in GRIF-Markov module and results of steady-state proba-
bilities are obtained by analytic computation engine Albizia-Markov. However, the results
are not verified with other methods in order to calculate the uncertainty.
• The wireless SISs are installed as an experimental safety systems. Thus, in the absence of
sufficient field data, results from SINTEF investigations are used for modeling inputs.
1.4 Structure of The Report
Generally, this thesis provide a guideline for performance analysis of a SIS consisting of a new
technology and in particular the availability/reliability analysis of the wireless SIS is investi-
gated. In the Section 2, wireless SIS is presented with its specifications where the importance of
analysis about WSN is demonstrated. In the section 3 a qualitative analysis about WSN has been
done by FMECA method which focuses on new added failures. The modeling and quantitative
analysis according to FMECA results is presented in section 4. In this section, Markov method
is suggested as an alternative approach for modeling and analysis of the system. In order to
exemplify the analysis method, a case study is done in the section 5 according to the proposed
method in section 4. At last the conclusion of the report and further research directions are
presented in section 6.
Chapter 2
Wireless Safety Instrumented Systems
Properties
According to IEC61508 (2010) a safety instrumented system (SIS) is an instrument, which imple-
ment one or more safety instrumented functions (SIF). A safety function is usually implemented
to protect against a specific undesired event that can cause harm. The system that is protected
by the safety-critical system is called equipment under control (EUC). A SIS may include software
or human action as a part of the SIFs. Each SIS is composed of any combination of sensors, logic
solver, or final elements. Sensors also refer to as an input element that detects the risk of the un-
desired event for EUC and sends the signal to the logic solver (Rausand and Høyland, 2004). The
communication medium for a group of sensors can be wired or wireless. A group of sensors that
communicate through the wireless channel is named a wireless sensor network (WSN). Similarly,
WSN can also be defined as a collection of distributed, autonomous sensor devices which col-
laborate in monitoring physical or environmental phenomena such as temperature, pressure,
vibration, noise, gas and smoke. The constant monitoring of a phenomenon by sensors results
in measuring and displaying the deviation from predefined indicators. The deviation can be
defined as an initiating event, which accordingly might lead to the undesired event (Rausand,
2011). In the following chapter a brief history about the development of wireless protocols and
standards is presented then WSN and its properties are introduced and finally the specification
regulations and challenges of wireless safety system are explained.
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2.1 Wireless SIS Specifications
Each SIS is composed of any combination of sensors, logic solver, or final elements (Rausand,
2014a). Traditionally, sensors are powered via a cable and similarly the detected signal is trans-
ferred using the same cable. Therefore every sensor is connected to the logic solver through
a wire. As a possible simplifying solution, the data from many sensors can be multiplexed in
a Junction-box and sent to the logic solver via a single wire. Figure 2.1 shows the two type of
sensors.
Figure 2.1: Wried and Wireless Sensors From SINTEF-ICT
In the new design, wireless technology is applied as an alternative to hard-wiring in order to
save installation costs. However, a wireless detector device consists of several elements, some
parts remain the same as traditional detectors, some new components are added and some
components are redesigned. A sensors network consists of a group of sensors that has wire-
less communication to access point . An access point is a send/receive device which receives
the signal from sensors by means of wireless and transmits them to the logic solver via a wired
connection. Similar procedure is executed in the reverse channel from the logic solver to the
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sensors (Yick et al., 2008).
For the wireless sensors, the controller (logic solver) and the sensors operate as questioner
and respondents such that the controller asks about the exposure status of sensors and then the
sensors respond. This request and respond procedure would be done in predefined time inter-
vals which are called diagnostic test intervals. From the safety controllers perspective, there is
no difference between a wireless and a wired sensor. The controller sends a request to a sensor
(regardless of connection type), and upon receiving the corresponding response, it will immedi-
ately send a new request. If the controller does not receive any response within 60 seconds from
a specific sensor it assumes the sensor dead (Ikram et al., 2013) (Petersen and Carlsen, 2014).
A wired sensor will send an immediate response upon reception of a request, as it has a high
capacity wired communication link, and unlimited power. The wireless sensor, on the other
hand, will take advantage of the "60 second timeout limit", and hold on to the request for some
time (approx. 18 sec) (Petersen et al., 2007). Figure 2.2 shows the principle of the communica-
tion procedure.
Figure 2.2: Wireless Communication Intervals
2.2 Wireless Sensor Network
A number of wireless sensor nodes (a few ten to thousands) with minimum infrastructure con-
stitute a WSN in order to monitor phenomena in a region. The WSN can be categorized into two
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different types of structured and unstructured . The difference is highlighted in location and
deployment of the sensors. The unstructured WSNs has random deployment of sensor nodes
while the structured networks has predetermined sensor nodes placement . The network main-
tenance, managing the connectivity of sensors and detecting the failures are challenging for
unstructured WSN, which is not well suited for a SIS.
The structured WSN is applied for a SIS such that the sensors are placed at specific locations
to provide coverage. This is an advantage since fewer nodes are deployed with lower network
maintenance and management cost (Yick et al., 2008).
2.2.1 WSN History
In 1980s, defense advanced research project agency (DARPA) of the US department of defense
developed the distributed sensor networks (DSNs) program as a conceptual model and was not
ready to apply in a great scale. In order to apply DSN, the size and the cost of sensors must
be reduced to make them practically applicable. During 1990s, DARPA initiated a research to
develop knowledge about ad-hoc networking, dynamic querying and tasking, reprogramming
and multi-tasking. This research program was carried out in parallel with IEEE research on
the different application of WSN. The research revealed some issues in WSN e.g. information
security is considered one of the main challenges in such networks. The first full standard that
was released based on the IEEE was the ZigBee in 2004. The ZigBee specification was initially
designed to address applications within home automation and consumer electronics (Radmand
et al., 2010).
The HART communication foundation (HCF) presented the HART field communication pro-
tocol specification in 2007, which was specifically designed for process automation applications
and named as WirelessHART. In 2010 WirelesHart was approved by IEC62591 as an international
standard for wireless communication in process automation (Falmmini and Sisinni, 2014).
Along with HCF, the international society of automation (ISA) conducted a family of stan-
dards for wireless systems in industrial automation applications and ratified the ISA100.11a
standard in 2009. This standard has provided a secure and reliable wireless communication for
non-critical monitoring and control applications in the process automation industries similar
to WirelessHART (Petersen and Carlsen, 2014).
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ISA100
The standards committee of ISA has lined up a set of standards adjusted for industrial automa-
tion. The first release introduced in 2009 and updated 2011, which is named ISA100.11a. The
standard is specified a secure and reliable wireless communication for non-critical monitoring
and control applications while the specification for critical monitoring are due to be published
in future versions (Petersen and Carlsen, 2014) .
IEEE Std. 802.15.4 physical layer (PHY) and medium access control (MAC) are the main idea
behind ISA100.11a. The definition for MAC in IEEE Std. 802.15.4 has designated frequency hop-
ping and extended security mechanisms while ISA100.11a only allows operating in 2.4 GHz band
(Petersen and Carlsen, 2014)(Steiner et al., 2014). time division multiple access (TDMA) with fre-
quency hopping is used as the channel access mechanism in ISA100.11a. In addition the stan-
dard supports both routing and non-routing devices, so network topology can be either star,
star-mesh or full mesh depending on the configuration and capabilities of the devices in the
network (Petersen and Carlsen, 2011).
According to ISA100.11a, a device can be as the visualization of the behaviors, configuration
settings, or capabilities in order to supply the essentials of implementation and operation of a
network. The function of a device is defined as roles where they must handle at least one. The
below is the list of roles and their functions according to (Petersen and Carlsen, 2014):
Input/output(I/O) device provides data to and/or utilizes data from other devices, that is, field
sensors and/or actuators. There is no routing capacity or message forwarding ability for
an I/O device and has the minimum specification required in ISA100.11a-compliant net-
work.
Router device is capable of forwarding and routing messages from other devices in the net-
work, which has a clock propagation capability which behaves as a proxy
Provisioning device is able to provision other devices to join the network.
Backbone router A backbone router is capable of routing messages via the backbone network.
Gateway device provides an interface between the wireless instrumentation network and the
plant network.
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System manager is responsible for governing the network, devices, and communications.
Security manager is a function that works together with the system manager to enable secure
system operation.
System time source is the master time source for the system. The common sense of time is
used to manage device operation.
In the Figure2.3 a typical network configuration of devices with their roles are shown. The
figure can highlight the difference between I/O role and router since I/O devices are not able to
route or forward messages (Petersen and Carlsen, 2014).
Figure 2.3: Typical ISA100.11a network configuration From ISA100.11a-2011 Standard
WSN Communication Protocol
Since WSN is applied for safety monitoring, the reliability and processing safety time are con-
sidered as essential requirements for the network. In order to be ensured about data delivery,
a query-based delivery method is applied to WSN where the controller asks about the exposure
status of sensors periodically. The delivery report received by the controller guaranties that data
received by sensors in the predefined time interval(Petersen and Carlsen, 2014).
A network constitutes of at least two nodes and a connection in between. The queries be-
tween the two nodes can be carried out by means of wires or wireless. As far as the commu-
nication technology is concerned, all transferred information must be encrypted according to
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standard communication protocols. This guaranties the accuracy and security of the transferred
information. In the other words, a communication protocol is a system of exchanging data be-
tween electronic devices. Moreover, a general standard language can prevent mismatch in com-
munication protocols among devices from different vendors (Stripf and Barthel, 2014).
Communication between the sensors and the controller for wired sensors is done by PROFINET
protocol. The wired sensor monitors a phenomenon, encrypts the data by using PROFISAFE
protocol. In the next step, the data packet is addressed to the destination by PROFINET commu-
nication protocol and it is sent to controller. The controller decrypts the data packet and process
the information inside the packet (Stripf and Barthel, 2014) (Petersen and Carlsen, 2014). The
controller query follows the same procedure which is illustrated in figure2.4.
Figure 2.4: Wired Network Protocol
In WSN, the communication protocol changes throughout the data transfer path from sen-
sors to the controller. Such a path includes different hops (jumps) over sensor nodes to access
point and a wired connection from access point to the controller. However addressing proto-
col is changed for wireless communication from PROFINET to ISA100a, the data encryption is
remained the same as the wired network. Applying PROFISAFE over ISA100a is considered as
a solution for wireless communication because it is certified and proven for safety application
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(Petersen and Carlsen, 2014).
In the WSN, query starts from the controller where it inquires about the exposure status of
sensors. The query would be packed according to PROFINET communication protocol before
being sent on the wire channel to the access point. It should be noted that the information part
of the packet is encrypted by PROFISAFE. As the data packet is received by access point, it is
readdressed based on ISA100a to the corresponding sensor. The sensor’s respond would follow
the same procedure to the controller. In the case that the route includes an internal hop among
sensors, addressing to destination sensor or the access point is done according to ISA100a (Stripf
and Barthel, 2014) (Wenzel, 2014) (Petersen and Carlsen, 2014). Figure2.5 shows wireless com-
munication protocols from sensors to controller.
Figure 2.5: Wireless Network Protocol
2.2.2 TDMA and Timeslots
In ISA100.11a, TDMA approach is applied for the main channel access where the communica-
tion is done within distinct time-slots of certain duration. As a device is added to the system,
the system manger assigns a specific time-slot to it. The accumulation of time-slots creates a
superframe, which is repeated over the network lifetime. Figure2.6 shows a super-frame. The
communication supervision is handled by the system manger which typically sets a source and
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a destination to each time-slot. During a times-lot, the source device may send a data packet
to a destination, such a data transfer naturally can be successful or unsuccessful. An unsuc-
cessful data packet transmission is named data packet-loss, which has a rate over time. On the
other hand for every successful data transmission an acknowledgment packet (ACK) is replied
from the receiver to the source device. In case of ACK failure, the receiver sends ACK in the next
available times-lot (Petersen and Carlsen, 2014).
Figure 2.6: Structure of TDMA timeslots and superframes from ICT Handbook
The network performance can be indicated by measuring the time interval between send-
ing and receiving a data packet. Moreover, the packet-loss rate and performance in time are
independent. In some cases, the late delivery is regarded as a packet-loss. In the communica-
tion network terminology, jitter and message transfer delay (latency) are two widely used terms
as the performance indicators and the communication reliability is defined as the amount of
data packet reached to destination device or delivery ratio and packet-loss rate (Bhuyan et al.,
2010). However, in the safety terminology the reliability of SIS is defined as ability of system to
perform its required functions according to the defined time interval to avoid undesired events
(Rausand and Høyland, 2004). Therefore, it is important for the reader to differentiate between
the communication and SIS reliability in this study.
2.2.3 WSN Constraints
The WSN consists of resource-constrained sensor nodes. Based on the monitored environment
and the application such constrains could be listed as the limited amount of energy, short com-
munication range, low bandwidth, and limited processing and storage capability in each node.
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The application environment plays a pivotal role in the design of WSN. For instance, outdoor
environment requires more sensor nodes in order to cover a wider region while indoor environ-
ments could be covered by fewer sensor nodes. Moreover, the obstruction and accessibility of
environment affect network connectivity and sensor deployment (Bhuyan et al., 2010).
There are generic (multi-purpose) and gateway (bridge) sensors available in the market. A
generic sensor node can measure different environmental phenomena while a gateway sensor
node can transfer data from generic node to the base station. Typically , a WSN includes both of
these two sensor groups.
In WSN the tasks can be classified into three major groups. The first group of tasks are re-
lated to sensor nodes individually while the second group is related to the communication pro-
tocol. The third group is the network service, which is the main focus point in this study. This
task group is related to efficiency, availability and reliability of the network (Yick et al., 2008).
However those task groups are highly linked together. For example, the protocol can strongly
influence on end to end delay, energy efficiency and packet-loss rate.
Energy
One of the important concerns in a WSN is energy supply as it is limited to a battery. In or-
der to maximize the network lifetime many intelligent methods are used including retaining the
energy through efficient and reliable wireless communication, intelligent sensor placement to
achieve adequate coverage, security and efficient storage management, and data aggregation
and compression. These alternatives approaches aim to meet the energy constraints as well as
providing a quality of service QoS for the network. The parameters such as congestion control,
active buffer monitoring, acknowledgments, and packet-loss recovery increases data packet de-
livery rate (Yick et al., 2008) (Petersen and Carlsen, 2014).
2.2.4 Network Quality
The network quality is an important specification to measure the network performance. The
quality of service QoS is defined as a set of service requirements that should be implemented
while the network transporting data packets stream between sources and destinations. In the
other words, QoS is a measurable indicator of network performance, which can be displayed by
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many indicators including packet loss probability, available bandwidth, end-to-end delay. The
required QoS is an agreement between the user and the service vendor (Chen and Varshney,
2004).
The requirements of QoS are expressed according to measurable metrics where different
network specification is of the interest. Those metrics have different specifications that are
grouped into three categories: additive, multiplicative, and concave (Snigdh and Gupta, 2014).
Additive , let m (n1 , n2 ) be a metric for link (n1 , n2 ). For any path P = (n1 , n2 , ···, ni , nj ),
metric m is: (Note here n1 , n2 , n3 , ···, ni , nj represent network nodes) additive , if m (P)
= m (n1 , n2 ) + m (n2 , n3 ) + ··· + m (ni , nj ). For example, the delay of a path is the sum of
the delay of every hop.
Multiplicative , if m (P) = m (n1 , n2 ) * m (n2 , n3 ) * ··· * m (ni , nj ) Example is the probability
sending successful data packet or reliability, in which case 0 < m (ni , nj ) < 1.
Concave , if m (P) = min m (n1 , n2 ), m (n2 , n3 ), ···, m (ni , nj ) For instance the minimum
available bandwidth illustrates the bandwidth of a path.
2.2.5 Challenges in WSN Design
using a wireless communication medium introduces a specific set of challenges in network de-
sign. Two of these challenges are briefly discussed here:
Energy and delay trade-off as the distance between the source and the destination increases,
the power consumption escalates, since it is a proportional to the distance squared. The incre-
ment of the distance also results in more exposure to the environment that may influence the
data packet-loss probability due to a noisy environment or a non-flat terrain. The proposed
solutions includes increasing number of hops which reduces the energy consumption signif-
icantly. On the other hand the multi-hop routing can result in the cumulative packet delay.
Moreover, multi-hop routing makes the analysis and the handling of delay-constrained traffic
complicated (Snigdh and Gupta, 2014).
Support of multiple traffic types applying multi proposes sensors may lead into multiple
technical issues related to data routing. Some sensors can detect motions via acoustic signa-
tures and measure the amount of leakage by IR beams. Such a multi-propose sensing can be
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assembled either in one device or conduct the function independently. In addition using sen-
sors with different data types introduces more challenges in the data routing. Accordingly, the
QoS may vary for different groups of data (Snigdh and Gupta, 2014).
2.3 Testing
Similar to conventional sensors, wireless sensors have two types of testing. (i) Functional, and
(ii) Diagnostic. Functional tests are typically carried out annually or every sixth month sepa-
rately among components. In this test most of the dangerous undetected (DU) failures are re-
vealed and repaired. For gas detectors failures such as calibration and sensors’ position will
normally be included during a functional test.
Diagnostic test is a procedure of request and response. The predefined time interval for the
controller to conclude that a sensor(s) is in a failed state is within 60 seconds. In this period, the
controller has the opportunity to "ask" the sensors about their status. It is important to know
that defining the logic of diagnostic test and request/response time frame are mainly related to
system developers as well as the programmers’ skills (Petersen and Carlsen, 2014).
2.4 Safety Regulations
Generally, the wireless technology requires operating in a specific frequency band. This limits
the network communication channels and reduces the probability of interference from other
wireless networks operating in the same area(Petersen et al., 2012). However, there is a lack of
official standards for wireless applications in safety instrumented systems. Thus, it is suggested
to combine general requirements and documented customer requirements for their wireless
sensors.
For general SIFs such as gas detection, (Norsok S-001, 2008) requires that:
“The gas detection system shall monitor continuously for the presence of flammable or toxic
gases, to alert personnel and allow control actions to be initiated manually or automatically to
minimize the probability of personnel exposure, explosion and fire. Typical response times that
should be complied with unless faster responses are specified elsewhere:
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• IR detector response time (T90) should be less than 5 s for general area applications, and
less than 2 s if used in HVAC ducting.
• Acoustic detector response time including delays employed to improve false alarm immu-
nity should not exceed 30 s.
• The time from detector alarm limit is reached until alarm is presented/tagged on operator
station should be less than 2 s (i.e. signal transmission time).
There shall be no predefined delays of actions initiated upon gas detection unless a delay is
safer. In such a case, this shall be clearly identified in relevant documentation such as FPDS and
C and E diagrams.
For gas detection in ventilation inlets IR type detector shall be located as close as possible to
the inlet to ensure fast detection”.
Technical requirements for wireless instrumentation have been established by the oil and
gas industry, regardless of application class (Petersen et al., 2012) (Petersen and Carlsen, 2014).
This includes (but are not limited to) the following categories:
• Unlicensed frequency bands
• Friendly coexistence with other wireless solutions
• Standardized and open solutions
• Protection from cyber-attacks and threats
• Quantifiable network performance
• The diagnostic test interval according to IEC 61508
According to the information in this chapter, the safety monitoring of wireless SIS which is
done by WSNs has a novelty in design and performance. The wireless SIS may have complexities
and new technical features which can create uncertainties concerning their field performance.
Due to the change in the communication medium for sensors, it is important to provide a prac-
tical and accurate method which can assess the reliability/availability of wireless SISs according
to standards and requirements.
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In the chapter 3 and 4 methods and techniques for qualitative and quantitative performance
and reliability assessment of wireless SIS is introduced.
Chapter 3
Qualitative Reliability Analysis of WSN
As a part of the assessment, it is necessary to have an understanding about system failure modes
and mechanisms. In addition, it is important to be aware of any changes in underlying failure
causes of the system when the wired sensors are replaced by wireless ones. To identify and ana-
lyze the failures,(Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis) FMECA can be an useful method.
Similarities between the wired and wireless sensors provided the ability to analyze two systems
in one common table. This approach simplifies the comparison between two types of system.
In appendix B.2 FMECA for wired and wireless sensors are presented. In the FMECA, wireless
network and sensors are taken into consideration for further analysis and other subsystems are
not relevant for this report.
3.1 FMECA Technique
A structured bottom-up technique Failure Modes, Effect, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is
a technique for analysis the effect of observed failures in subsystem and system. FMECA ap-
proach enables the user to understand how a component failure occurs and what will be the
consequences of the failure on the subsystems and system level. The analysis of failure modes
and effect is done by tabulating in a worksheet (Rausand and Høyland, 2004) (Rausand, 2014a).
3.1.1 Objectives
Application purposes of FMECA analysis are as follow:
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• List the possible failure modes of the systems that are rooted back to components
• Demonstrate the failure causes
• Harmonized between detected and undetected failures
As FMECA is able to list the failure modes and causes, the main objective is to obtain the risk for
each failure mode and to what extend are serious the different failure modes. However, FMECA
reveals all relevant failure modes, failure rates and severity, it may be only consisted of qualita-
tive data(Rausand, 2014a) .
3.1.2 Assessment Procedure
FEMCA should be carried out by a group of experts that are constituted of system designers, and
safety engineers in order to determine a wide range of scenarios for the system failure. In the
figure 3.1 the relevant inputs and outputs of the FMECA are illustrated.
Figure 3.1: Input and output of FMECA
In this study, a FMECA is done for the qualitative failure analysis of WSN subsystem and
wireless SIS, but the controller and actuator is not considered as a part of analysis. The FMECA
can be find in appendix B.2. The obtained results from the FMECA is used in the new failure
analysis (Rausand, 2014a).
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3.2 New Failures Analysis
According to the FMECA and (Munir et al., 2015), there can be several failure causes, which are
added to the sensor subsystem (WSN). The failures can be divided into two groups, (i) sensor
devices failure (ii) network (communication) failure. Both types of failures are detected by diag-
nostic test and most of them can be labeled as dangerous detected (DD) failures.
sensor device failures
New components in wireless sensors add up to some new failure causes with same failure mode
as for conventional wired system.
a) Power source concerns in this group are mainly related to battery lifetime. Although, the
battery failure results in dangerous failure in the sensor device, it is detected within diag-
nostic test interval. Hence it can be considered as a DD failure. For battery, the failures
rate is negligible to have impact on total failure rate of sensor. In addition, battery suffers
from degradation (gradual failure) rather than sudden failure, where operator is aware of
battery status by constant monitoring (i.e. ignoring operator’s error and assuming that
timely change of batteries are covered by procedures). However, there can be an increase
unavailability of system because of some extra maintenance time for changing the battery
compared to wired sensors.
b) Processing module can be investigated from two points of view, sensing and communica-
tion. From the sensing point of view, this investigation is mainly related to human pro-
gramming error. The processing module is responsible for analysis of sensor data and
encapsulates it in data packets according to the communication protocol. Since the pro-
cessing logic (calibration) are the same or wired and wireless, the failure rate can be as-
sumed equal. From the network point of view, the processing module is responsible for
handling and scheduling the communication. This is discussed more in the communica-
tion protocol failure 3.2.
d) Sensing module for increasing the battery lifetime is necessary to be redesigned and mod-
ified. This involves combining acoustic sensing technology with IR technology in order to
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reduce power consumption by IR beam. But this redesigning introduces additional failure
modes compared to conventional IR sensors. Moreover, IR source must be warmed-up
before a measurement is performed, and it must cool-down afterwards. In the discussion
section 3.3 this is explained further.
e) Other failures there can be other faults in the sensors often related to hardware. Hardware
failures related to the wireless communication appear as packet-loss /no communication
from a system point of view.
Remarks: There are reported failures in traditional wired sensors that are caused by water
intrusion in “Junction boxes” and freezing inside. In wireless sensors the elimination of wires
causes exclusion of “Junction box”, and consequently no failure of this type.
Moreover, new types of wireless sensors feature so called lifetime calibration, which means
that no field calibration is required. However, in some cases, a calibration failure may still be
occurred when conventional sensors in field are used with wireless features added to it.
Communication protocol failure
One of the important factors influencing the reliability of a wireless network is programming
of the network protocol. The network protocol can bring about several failure causes, which
all points back to error in defining the network protocol. There are examples of these errors
that may put the diagnosis testing or failure detection in loop and consequently confusion in
safety system. Since the programming is done manually, such failures are related either to the
programmers skills or to surroundings. In some cases, the system may have delay in transferring
the data packet which causes delay in sensing. However, most of the protocol errors are revealed
after a while when the operation test (debugging) is performing.
Occupied channel failures
This happens when a specific communication channel, which has the specific frequency, is not
available when it is needed. The possible reasons for being occupied can be divided into two cat-
egorizes; intentional and unintentional. Intentional occupation is named as “jamming”. This is
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related to a malicious attack on the network and intentional effort to disrupt the communica-
tion in the network. This may also be a new reason for false alarm in the system. Unintentional
occupation can be classified as follow:
a) Noise that is caused by equipment operating in the same area as the sensors network (e.g.
Microwave)
b) Interference that is caused by other radio frequency network operating in the same area
(e.g. walkie talkie)
c) Fading that is caused by the environment where the transmitted data packet fades away
due to reflection and attraction effects of surroundings (e.g. Metal pipelines or walls)
d) Access point failure since the access point is a device in series with all the detectors, it
is important to consider this node as a failure cause of network failure. The access point
configuration is similar to detectors without sensing and power modules. A block diagram
of access point is shown in Figure3.2.
Figure 3.2: Access Point Structural Block
e) Wireless network management failure this device has a system manager/security man-
ager/gateway function based on ISA100.11a, and combining this with the field wireless
access point composes the field wireless system. This device is located in series with the
access point and has its own failure rate. Hence, the failure of the network manager causes
network failure and loss of communication. But a failure in the network manager can be
detected within the diagnostic test interval.
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Remarks wireless gas detectors are dependent on the area and surroundings. This means
there are a number of factors influencing the quality of data transmission in wireless systems.
For example, if the weather humidity changes the wireless network quality can be changed and
as a result the percentage of packet loss may be changed. Therefore, it is possible to have similar
sensor models with the same configuration operating in two different areas (e.g. onshore and
offshore) with different QoS.
Moreover, there are some factors such as ventilation systems and position of sensors close
to areas likely to have leakage that should be taken into account for positioning of sensors. But
for wireless there are some added factors such as correct positioning to prevent static fade in
network and channel occupation failures, which introduce some additional challenges.
3.3 Discussion
In (Norsok S-001, 2008) it is stated that the time from exposure of sensors to phenomenon until
the alarm activation should be less than 7 seconds. This time is calculated as the summation of
sensing time, i.e. 5 seconds, and 2 seconds of transmitting the data to controller and activation
of the alarm. However, there are some sensing cases for which the process safety time may dif-
fer. The reason can be the time frame that each node are allowed to communicate, warming up
time and cooling down of sensors, data packet-loss, environmental conditions, etc. Defining a
formula correctly for the process safety time is almost impossible, as it involves a lot of uncorre-
lated parameters from different parts of the system (sensor, processing, time-slots, scheduling),
so there will be some cases where the process safety time may be longer than the required time.
As far as the sensors have new design that are featured by IR in standby mode with active
acoustic sensing, the warm up time is added to the sensing time. Also, in some cases the system
may have additional delays in sensing when it has data packet-loss. In the other words there is
a possibility that the system would be unable to meet the response time requirements of a (gas)
sensors according to (Norsok S-001, 2008).
The term diagnostic test interval is mentioned in (Norsok S-001, 2008), however the duration
of this interval is not specified. The exiting wireless sensors are able to detect a failure in sensors
sub-system within 60 seconds. On the other hand, for wired sensors, the detection of failures for
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the sensors sub-system will be accomplished right at the occurrence of failure, but for wireless
due to power saving issues this detection takes longer time.
Based on reliability engineering concepts, adding complexity into a system may reduce its
reliability and in best case keeps it at the same level. As can be seen from the failure analysis,
there are several failure causes, which results in increasing the unavailability of the system. As
a result, a wireless SIS has some reduced reliability and availability compared to a traditional
wired system. As it is revealed the main reason behind the failure of WSNs is related to packet-
loss. This rate can be measured and monitored by controller where the number of successful
reached packets is counted. It is therefore reasonable to focus on the packet-loss rate and the
unavailability of SIS for the reliability assessment purpose and modeling in the rest of study.
Chapter 4
Quantitative Reliability analysis
In the chapter 2 and 3 wireless safety system are introduced and investigated in detail. The
qualitative analysis reveals some issues, which are introduced to the SIS by shifting the commu-
nication medium from wired to wireless. All the efforts is toward illustrating those important
issues and establishment of a model is the main step in order to quantify the system reliability.
Accordingly, an alternative method for modeling of the system is suggested in this chapter.
4.1 Modeling Key Issues
As far as reliability analysis concerns, packet-loss rate and delay are one of the important metrics
for network performance (Chen and Varshney, 2004). The investigation on the system failures
reveals that most of the failures are originated from three categories: Hardware, Environment
and Human error. The failure of antenna, processor, memory, access point, and battery are
regarded as a hardware failure while channel occupation, interference and fading are relevant
to environmental factors. However the calibration and programming of wireless protocol are
related to human error, it may result in hardware error as well.
According to IEC61508 (2010), the failures can be random hardware failure and systematic
failures. Random faults are related to physical damages of the hardware in the system, which are
rooted from corrosion, thermal stressing and wear-out. Systematic faults are caused by human
error during system development and operation. From this point of view, all environmental fac-
tors are lead to random hardware failures while error in programming and defining the network
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protocol results in systematic failures.
Multi-state modeling
The main idea of the modeling is originated back to multi-state system modeling where the
system may have a number of states rather than just working and fail states (Lisnianski, 2007).
Defining operating and fail state is a challenge for multi-state systems since there may exist
number of intermediate states. In the intermediate states the system is still operating with lower
capacity than its maximum. as far as a WSN functions in different operational modes, it can be
regarded as a multi-state system. Different states are rooted from different QoS over time. QoS
concept that was mentioned in chapter 2 2 can be considered as an indicator of WSN states.
In order to consider QoS as an indicator of the WSN state, a measurable metric must be as-
signed to QoS. As it was mentioned, well-known metrics include bandwidth, delay, jitter, cost,
packet-loss rate and so on (Chen and Varshney, 2004). From the other point of view, it is impor-
tant to apply the metrics that plays a pivotal role in QoS of wireless SIS. In addition, the most
relevant metric must be chosen for this study, considering the important issues in the failure
analysis, the study limitations and time constrain. There is a discussion over selection of ap-
propriate metrics for QoS. The data packet-loss rate and time latency are the relevant indicators
for the network performance as they are dynamic over time and monitor different levels of QoS
in the system. Moreover, qualitative results of the system demonstrated the important effect of
these metrics on sub-systems and system. Both of the metrics are relevant for modeling a multi-
state system with different functioning states. For instance, the time latency of zero second can
be regarded as the best case while infinite latency can be the worst performance and a number
of intermediate states can be in between.
The packet-loss rate displays network performance over time in the WSN modeling. More-
over the time latency can be applied as another alternative for indication of WSN performance
similar to data packet-loss rate. Hence, different states of the system can be defined based on the
data packet-loss rate in every moment of time or the delay for data transmission. For example;
State0= P(t0), State1= P(t1), State2= P(t2), · · · , StateN = P(tn) (4.1)
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Where P(tn) is rate of data packet-loss at time tn . The states can be illustrated by time latency
as follow;
State0= T0, State1= T2, State2= T2, · · · ,StateN = Tn (4.2)
Where Tn is the delay in transmission for data packet number n.
4.2 Markov Approach
Markov process is a suitable method for dynamic or multi-state systems. This model uses failure
rate λ and repair rate µ .and starts from the initiating state. As time passes, the system jumps
among its defined states. The Markov model must have finite and discrete number of states over
continues time frame that follows Markov process property. The states space is collection of all
states and is denoted by X (Rausand, 2014b).
Let X (t ) denotes the states of system at time t then Pr(X (t )= i )= Pi(t ) and it is the probability
of being at state i at time t for i = 0,1,2,3. . . ,r and r +1 is the finite number of states of system.
This is called continuous time Markov process because X (t ) and probability change over time
(Rausand, 2014b).
4.2.1 Markov process property
Markov is a memory less process such that the system jumps to other states, independent of the
its background or history of pervious jumps. For example, if the system jumps from state 1 to
state 2, in the second jump from state 2 the system would not consider state 1 as a condition for
the next jump. This can be formulated by a conditional probability which Hs is the history of
system before being in the state i at time s and is going to estimate the probability of jumping
into state j at time t + s (Rausand and Høyland, 2004).
Pr(X (t + s)= j | X (s)= i ∩Hs)= Pr(X (s+ t )= j | X (s)= i ) (4.3)
More over the probability Pr(X (s+ t )= j | X (s)= i ) is independent of time s and call homo-
geneous transition probabilistic process.
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Pr(X (s+ t )= j | X (s)= i ) for al l s (4.4)
It is also assume that the transition probability is continues.
lim
Pij→∞
=
 1 i = j0 i = j (4.5)
The total departure from state i multiply with the probability of jumping from state i to j is
transition rate or jump rate and denoted as ai j . So it is possible to assign jump rate between
each connected states.
αi j =αi .pij (4.6)
Where αi is the total rate of departure from state i and therefore the sum over all possible
jumping rate is;
αi =
r∑
j=0
i 6= j
αi j (4.7)
The transition rate matrix is established as below;
Am,n =

a00 a01 · · · a0r
a10 a11 · · · a1r
...
...
. . .
...
ar 0 ar 1 · · · ar r
 (4.8)
Example: Assuming state 0 is working state of a single channel and state 1 is fail stated of
channel. More over the failure rate of system is λ and repair rate of system is µ then the sketch
of Markov diagram can be illustrated as in figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: two states Markov diagram
The major problem of this method is observed when the target system consists of a large
number of components. This can create several states and make the model very extensive and
time consuming to establish and run.However, Markov gives "accurate" results, establishing the
model by hand would be error prone. It is therefor easier to suffice to a specific category of
failures reliability analysis of the system rather than covering the whole aspect of system.
4.2.2 Jump Rate Evaluation
The jump rate plays a pivotal role in reliability quantification however obtaining those rates are
not straight forward. One alternative is to monitor the WSN performance and measure the level
of data packet-loss, then it is possible to observe how frequent WSN operates with certain QoS
level. Those number can be consider as the rate for its assign state.
Jump rates can be called as the failure rate when each jump is a representative of a failure in
the system. Therefore, the method for failure rate estimation can be applicable for estimation
of jump rates.
Brissaud Approach(Brissaud et al., 2010)
It is common among practitioners to use generic failure rates from data handbooks to han-
dle the lack of reliability feedback data for a specific piece of equipment. However, they may
assume these data can be applied in their systems directly without considering details related
to technical, operational and environmental conditions underlying the generic data. This may
cause uncertainty in reliability estimation of the system
(Brissaud et al., 2010)defines reliability influencing factors (RIFs), which act on system’s reli-
ability as the internal and external parts of a system. The effects may be positive, by causing a
reduction of the failure intensity, or negative, by causing a higher failure intensity. One impor-
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tant aspect of this approach is classification of influencing factors according to life cycle phase
of system. The author has also introduced a seven-step methodology for evaluating failure rates.
The main steps are as follows:
1. Functional analysis and input data
2. Model definition and influencing factors selection
3. Indicators selection and graduation
4. Influencing factors rating
5. Indicator function
6. Influencing functions
7. Final results
4.3 Modeling of Basic WSN
A simple model is developed by considering a single sensor with the access point as a basic WSN
that is a part of a whole SIS with controller and actuator which is shown in figure 4.2. Access
point communicate with sensor via wireless which is provide a basic WSN of two nodes and a
communication channel in between. The WSN has different packet-loss rate during time due to
several influencing factors.
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Figure 4.2: Single sensor WSN
As it was mention, the system states can be based on the data packet-loss rate over time.
However there are a wide variety of rates over time, it is necessary that Markov states limit to
definite number of state. Table 4.1 describes different states of a single channel based on data
packet-loss rate in 4 levels. The Markov diagram is illustrated in figure 4.3.
Table 4.1: Markov State of 1oo1 WSN
States Description
0 The channel is functioning with P0 rate of data packet-loss
1 The channel is functioning with P1 rate of data packet-loss
2 The channel is functioning with P2 rate of data packet-loss
3 The channel is functioning with P3 rate of data packet-loss
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Figure 4.3: Markov Diagram of Single Sensor WSN
4.3.1 Model Description
Figure 4.3 illustrates different jumps of the WSN among these states. As can be seen from the
figure system can jump from each state to another state. It starts from initiating state of system
S0, and may jump to other states with different jump rates. It should be noted that the states
are ordered in the descending way where S0 is the best performance for WSN and S3 is worst.
In the other words S0 has the lowest and S3 has the highest packet loss rate. It is assumed that
the WSN starts the monitoring of environment with S0 state and then may jump to lower states
temporarily or permanently.
4.3.2 Temporary and Permanent Jumps
Temporary jumps
It is important to consider the reason for the degradation of QoS. For example if transient object
blocks the communication and reduce the QoS for a short period of time. Then the WSN jump
into lower state when the object is presented and jump back to it is initiating state as soon as
the object is removed. This type of jump can be considered as a temporary jumps and rooted
by temporary blockage, sudden weather change and other transient issues. The contribution of
these type of jumps to steady state probability is usually negligible.
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Permanent jumps
This jump may be rooted from physical degradation of sensors, installing new wireless system
in vicinity or other permanent changes in surrounding. Each of these reasons would result in
lower QoS of the WSN and such a low QoS persists until the correction action is performed.
In order to carry out the analysis, modeling most be simplified as much as possible hence it
is important to eliminate the jumps that are not realistic to happen. For instance, the QoS would
be back to the initiating state S0 after each correction thus there should not be any intermediate
improvement of QoS i.e. jump from S2 to S1. Another important issue is the number of states
that is defined for the WSN. The WSN can have a wide range of QoS. The definition of WSN
performance can be done according to grouping similar performance level of WSN. This can be
carried out by the experts and the users. For example, there may be no difference between 70%
and 60% packet-loss rate for some users while it is significant for others.
4.4 1oo2 WSN
In this case the WSN is constituted of an access point and two independent sensors which they
operate as one out of two voting group. The voting group of 1oon means at least one working
element is enough in order to accomplish the system’s function. Figure 4.4 illustrates a 1oo2
WSN.
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Figure 4.4: 1oo2 Sensors WSN
The following WSN has a slight change over voting group which is due to redundancy. The
redundancy is the way to arrange a group of component that can compensate their failure. It
is therefore resulted in higher level of QoS since the packet-loss rate should be lower compare
to single sensor. However this result is theoretically true, in practice the system may behave in
different way due to dependency among sensors.
The modeling of 1oo2 WSN is similar to the single sensor WSN in terms of different states and
modeling strategies. In addition, 1oo2 WSN may have more different states due to redundancy
but the main difference would be observed in jump rates. The reason beyond that is in regard
with the voting and redundancy since the probability of losing two data packets is lower than
losing one.
In fact, the proposed model considers the whole group of sensors as a single block with
different states. This approach simplifies the complexity of WSN which analytic models such
as fault tree are not able to do it. Hence, the techniques would be similar to 1oo1 system with
different jump rate values and number of states. Defining the relevant states are an outstanding
issue which is necessary to be clarified for Markov method. An alternative technique for defining
the states for Markov is introduced in the case study.
Chapter 5
Case Study
This chapter is written according to an experiment carried out by Stig Petersen from SINTEF and
Simon Carlsen from Statoil (Petersen and Carlsen, 2009) . In this experiment an specific WSN
observed and the results were published in (Petersen and Carlsen, 2009) in 2009. This paper is
an investigation over the performance of WirelessHART network in an industrial environment,
however an industrial laboratory was chosen in order to have complete control of work activity
and operation of other wireless devices.
5.1 Case Description
The WSN is constituted of 9 wireless sensors and one gateway sensor which are located in the
lab as figure 5.1. The factors such as signal interference, coexistence of network operating with
IEEE802.11g and the jamming from a 2.4GHz device were chosen as an important influencing
factor on QoS. By examining different conditions in regard with the mentioned factors, different
QoS levels are observed and measured. In order to measure the QoS level packet-loss rate and
latency are chosen as indicators of network performance. In this thesis, it is decided to use
packet-loss rate as an indicator of QoS due to the limitations.
There is an indicator in the article that is named as reliability and shows the number of suc-
cessful packets reached to destination. However, the number of successful data packet or reli-
ability can be high due to data re-transmission, there may exist high packet-loss rate at same
time. Hence, the system may have high reliability for data delivery while has high packet-loss
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rate at the same time.
Figure 5.1: Sensors’ Location
5.2 Performance
The first part of experiment was related to normal system operation and lasted for 120 hours.
During this part,a small fluctuation was observed among 0% , 1% and 2%. Thus, the QoS of 1%
is considered as an average QoS when the network is operating in normal condition without any
disturbance from environment. Figure 5.2 shows the normal condition packet-lost rate over 120
hours time interval.
Figure 5.2: Packet-loss Rate-Normal (from Network Performance by Petersen and Carlsen 2008)
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It should be noted that in the first 30 hours the packet-loss rate is around 3% which is due to
working-related activity in this period.
5.2.1 WSN Performance With Coexistence IEEE 802.11g
The second part of test was to install a WLAN which operate with IEEE802.11g and may influ-
ence on QoS of WirelessHART network. Three access points are installed in order to transmit
data in the certain time interval. This would results in interference failure that is mentioned
in qualitative reliability analysis. It is important to know how much frequent the access points
transmit data. Hence, the transmission interval set to 100 ms in the first three hours while it
becomes more frequent to 20 ms in the rest of test. The packet-loss rate is displayed in figure 5.3
.
Figure 5.3: Packet-loss Rate-Coexistence IEE802.11g (from Network Performance by Petersen
and Carlsen 2008)
As can be seen from the figure the packet-loss probability mounted drastically up to 35% as
the data transmission increased and often fluctuated between 25% to 30%.
5.2.2 Jamming
Third part of the test revealed the behavior of system when attacks from a 2.4 GHz linear chirp
jamming device are occurred. A chirp is a signal with increasing or decreasing frequency with
time, mostly sinusoidal shape. Linear variation of frequency with time gives linear chirp while
exponential variation of frequency with time gives exponential chirp.
CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY 39
The jamming device was located in 1 meter distance from gateway node. The figure 5.4
illustrates the packet-loss rate while the device started to operate. The jammer started to send
signals from the fifteenth minute and operates for 45 minutes. During this interval packet-loss
rate dramatically increased to 100% and resulted in complete network breakdown. This type of
attack can be happened intentionally and is dependent in the distance of device to sensors to
some extent.
Figure 5.4: Packet-loss Rate-Jamming (from Network Performance by Petersen and Carlsen
2008)
5.3 Modeling
As it was presented before, an alternative way to model WSN which is compatible with WSN
specification, is Markov method. In order to apply Markov, it is necessary to define the relevant
states of the system and the jump rate values. The results of the experiment over the system
performance would provide a knowledge about definition of system states and relevant jumps
among different system states. It is therefore straightforward to proceed with Markov method
to model the system.
In order to define system state, the QoS should be considered as an alternative indicator
of system states. However, the QoS of WSN is not stable over the time and jump several times
among different packet-loss rates, the difference is small over time. For example,in the normal
condition QoS jumps between 0%, 1% and 2% several times. Since the variation of QoS is not
significant in each condition, with consideration of different system performance, it is possible
to consider average packet-loss rate. Table 5.1 shows the defined states of the system according
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to performance analysis.
Table 5.1: Markov State of 1oo10 WSN
States Description
1 The WSN is functioning with 1% data packet-loss
2 The WSN is functioning with 5% data packet-loss
3 The WSN is functioning with 25% data packet-loss
4 The WSN is failed (100% data packet-loss)
The jump rates over the states are obtained by expert judgment and the experience from the
WSN SIS test in the platform. As it was noted, the sufficient method to obtained a jump rate is
observation and monitoring. However, in some cases the system is new and there is no available
field performance history, RIF method and test data can be another alternative techniques to
obtain jump rates. Those methods provide an impression about jump rates but the final results
may not be accurate enough and the degree of uncertainty over final results must be taken into
consideration. The table 5.2 shows the jump rate.
Table 5.2: Jump Rates
Jump 1→ 2 2→ 3 3→ 4 1→ 4 2→ 4 4→ 1 3→ 2 2→ 1
Rate (per minute) 0.74 0.245 0.015 0.0008 0.0001 0.1 1 1
5.3.1 Model Description
The system specification and limitation are caused elimination of some jumps. For instance,
there is no sudden jump from 1% packet-loss to 25%, but rather a gradual degradation from 1%
to 5% and then to 25%. On the other hand, there are sudden jumps from initiating state to total
failure where the system jumps from 1%, 5% and 25% to 100%. Those jumps are happened when
the common cause failures occurs. In addition, the repair action can be carried out when the
system is fully breakdown (100% packet-loss) and bring system back to its initiating state (1%
packet-loss). The intermediate jumps such as jumping from state 2 to 1 or 3 to 2 is due to the
fluctuation of QoS over time. Figure 5.5 shows the possible jumps of the WSN over time.
CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY 41
Figure 5.5: Markov Diagram of The WSN Case
5.3.2 Assumptions
First and the most important assumption is that the QoS degradation follows exponential dis-
tribution. It means the probability that the QoS of WSN degraded increases exponentially over
time. It is also assumed the repair action follows exponential distribution where the repair of the
system is accomplished by one maintenance crew. Similarly, the temporary intermediate jumps
have the exponential distribution.
There is no repair action in state 2 and 3 since the WSN is still operating. Hence, the system
may jump back to states with the better QoS as soon as the temporary issue is removed.
The dependency among states are consider into the jumps from state 1 to 4 or jump from
state 2 to 4. There may be a dependency on the probability of intermediate states which is not
consider in this modeling. For example If the system jump from state 1 to state 2 it is more
probable to jump to state 3.
5.3.3 Steady State Probabilities
In the WSN, it is important to know how much portion of time the system spend in each state.
Accordingly the long run probabilities is of the interest. This means the probability that the
system spend in each state independent of time (t →∞) during long run.
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lim
t→∞Pj(t )= Pj for j = 0,1,2,3, · · · (5.1)
According to (Rausand, 2014b) the steady state equation for the WSN can be established as
follow.
(
P1 P2 P3 P4
)
×

a11 a12 a13 a14
a21 a22 a23 a24
a31 a32 a33 a34
a41 a42 a43 a44
=
(
0 0 0 0
)
(5.2)
There are some techniques such as numerical method to solve the equation 5-2. By increas-
ing the number of states and consequently the rank of matrix, solving of the equation become
tedious and time consuming. It is therefore decided to apply software to solve the matrix equa-
tion. This approach provide a practical way to solve high rank matrices.
GRIF-Markov Graph Module
GRIF is an analytical software for dependability analysis of the system. This software provides
users a wide variety of techniques to choose the method of the interest for the analysis. GRIF-
Workshop is designed and has been developed by Total Company.
According to (GRIF-Workshop) the Markov module is able to model and compute small dy-
namic systems with Markov method. This module applies analytic computation engine Albizia-
Markov and is able to solve multi-phase systems. ALBIZIA, engine is developed based on effi-
cient matrix computation algorithms.The user is able to draw Markov diagram easily and insert
jump rates in the model, then software computes and delivers results such as, the steady-state
probabilities, the sojourn times in each state, the availability/reliability of the system and so on.
The Model graph in the software is provided in Appendix B.1 and steady-state probabilities
are illustrated in table 5.3. In addition figure 5.6 shows how the the steady-state probabilities
change over time and figure 5.7 show the sojourn time of each state.
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Table 5.3: Steady-state Probabilities
P1 0.5132
P2 0.3763
P3 0.09231
P4 0.01673
Figure 5.6: Probability of Different QoS Levels
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Figure 5.7: Sojourn Time of Each State
5.4 Analysis
It is necessary in the quantitative reliability analysis to elaborate the calculation and the results
that are obtained. The most important part is to compare those numbers in order to provide an
impression about availability, WSN performance and safety level of the SIF.
The first part of the results is related to the steady-state probability. As can be seen from the
figure 5.6 the probability to have 1% packet-loss rate for the WSN has the highest portion with
probability of 0.5132 and 5% packet-loss rate has the second place with 0.3763. This level of
performance can be an acceptable level for a WSN where the system totally spend 90% of time
with high QoS (0% - 5% packet-loss rate).
The availability of sensor network is another issue to analysis. Since it is not straight forward
to consider some states as an available state of the WSN, the availability of WSN follows different
rules. First of all , it is necessary to define the availability of single sensor where the sensor can
transmit data before time-out successfully. On the other hand, each sensor has three opportu-
nities to send the data packet in the time-out interval. If all three chances are lost, then an alarm
in the control room signals about failure of the related sensor in such a case. Figure 5.8 shows
the chances before time-out.
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Figure 5.8: Three opportunities for data packet transmission
There are different scenarios about unavailability of a sensor. The sensor can be unavailable
either three response or three request data packets are lost in row. Moreover, unavailability can
be due to those lost response and request data. All of those scenarios would result in signaling
an alarm in control room about unavailability of related sensor. In case of losing 3 sequential
data packets, it is expressed that there is a dangerous and detected failure in the system. Figure
5.9 shows different scenarios for unavailability of a WSN due to data packet-loss.
The dependency among different packet-loss scenarios is not considered in the availability
calculation but rather an interval is established for unavailability duration. The lower bound is
for the unavailability duration when the packet-losses are fully independent and upper bound
is when they are fully dependent. The calculation for QoS of 1% is shown as an example. In this
way, the total availability is summation over all different QoS levels.
Probability of losing 3 sequential data packet = 0.01×0.01×0.01 (5.3)
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Figure 5.9: Different Data Packet-loss Scenarios
It is assumed that if a response packet is lost then the associated request is lost inevitably
and vice versa. The calculated probability of 10−6 is unavailability of the system while it has QoS
of 1%. As the WSN spends 51.32% of time in long-run with QoS of 1% then the 10−6 should be
multiplied with 0.5132. This calculation must be done for other QoS levels. Table 5.4 shows the
Lower-bound of unavailability for a single sensors for different QoS.
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Figure 5.10: Average Unavailability Interval Over Time
Table 5.4: Unavailability Independence Packet-loss
QoS Unavailability
1% 5.132×10−7
5% 4.703×10−5
25% 1.442×10−3
100% 1.15×10−2
Total 1.294×10−2
Therefore a single sensor is unavailable approximately 1% of time.The calculated number is
the lower bound of unavailability interval. In order to calculate the upper bound the full depen-
dency have to be considered. The full dependency of data transmission happens when failure of
the first data packet makes an inevitable transmission failure for the second and third packets.
The table 5.5 shows the upper bound of unavailability which is related to fully dependent data
packets and the figure 5.10 shows the interval of unavailability over time.
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Table 5.5: Unreliability-Dependent Packet-loss
QoS Unavailability
1% 5.132×10−3
5% 1.88×10−2
25% 2.27×10−2
100% 1.15×10−2
Total 5.818×10−2
There is a considerable sensitivity of the unavailability to the number of data transmission
opportunities. By increasing the number of transmitted packets in a time-out interval, the avail-
ability would be affected but it may consume a lot of energy due to more frequent data trans-
mitting.
However,the whole WSN would be unavailable 0.1 % of time for 1oo10 WSN, the number of
sensors unavailability signaling would be increase by 10 due to redundancy of sensors. Table 5.6
illustrate the the number of time an alarm signals in different running duration for 1oo10 WSN.
Table 5.6: Number of Signaling for Unavailability
Days Number of signaling
100 240
186 446
365 876
This was a sample case of wireless detectors of 1oo10 voting system. Adding sensors to this
system would make the system even more robust with respect to redundancy in communication
channel. However, the system always suffers from common cause failures, which redundancy
cannot overcome. Moreover, adding up to the number of sensors would increase the number of
unavailability signaling due to failure of each sensor.
The availability is an performance factor which is important for system users. The investiga-
tion about availability is important since there may be a new installed wireless system with an
acceptable safety level with very low unavailability. This system has not enough attraction for
users as it needs a lot of correction actions during SIS lifetime.
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Dangerous Failure
The jump rates that are applied in the model are grouped as dangerous failures where the SIF
is not able to perform the safety function. However, those failures result in unavailability of the
system, the failure would be detected within the time-out interval. Hence, the modeling and
analysis has been over DD failures. The only situation that those failure may not be detected
is while unavailability signaling is not able to be done after time-out interval. In this study, the
failure of such has not been consider as an alternative reason for occurrence of DU failures.
According to FMECA analysis, all the added new failures causes are categorize in DD group of
failures. Thus, in the modeling and analysis of the system the availability of the system is more
of the interest and the DU failure remains similar to wired system. The probability of failure
on demand (PFD) of the system remains same as before and the system would have the same
quantitative SIL.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This study demonstrates pros and cons of utilizing wireless safety system with the focus on re-
liability and failures of wireless SIS. Those system are redesigned by applying WSN instead of
traditional wired sensors. Even though SIS reliability entails reliability of each subsystem, the
modeling and analysis was centered around WSN due to the fact that the major difference in
studying SIS reliability lays in WSN reliability.
Several failure causes are observed using FMECA, which are unique for the wireless SIS. It is
shown during the qualitative analysis that most added failure can be categorized as DD failures.
Hence, the main focus of the reliability analysis is over unavailability of WSN. Moreover, it is
inferred that packet-loss, which is an indicator of wireless QoS, is the obvious underlying reason
for the new failures. It is possible to monitor the status of the WSN by linking the packet-loss
rate to QoS and accordingly to WSN performance. Therefore, the packet-loss rate is considered
as the indicator of WSN performance in a given moment.
Markov approach (Rausand, 2014b) is one of the suitable methods for modeling SIS accord-
ing to IEC61508 (2010). To do such a modeling, WSNs are considered as a multi-state systems
where the state of the system jumps between possible states in time. WSNs are by nature com-
plex structures but the proposed model is required to be simple in order to be practical. There-
fore, this study first simplifies the WSN and then proposes the model for the simplified structure.
Accordingly the presented model is understandable such that the verification of the SIS perfor-
mance becomes straightforward and sufficiently accurate for safety applications. Therefore, the
proposed study methodology can be used as an alternative guideline for the industries that are
50
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 51
going to apply wireless safety systems.
The presented approached is applied to experiment data provided by SINTEF and Statoil(Petersen
and Carlsen, 2009). Based on the experiment data relevant system states are defined where the
jump in the system are based on significant changes in QoS. Finally, the system unavailability
which is the important issue in the qualification analysis is calculated and tabulated.
The main goal of this study was centered on presenting an alternative way to analyze the
reliability of wireless SIS. The methodology of this study can be used as a guideline for such
an analysis. Knowing system specifications and properties would pave the way in obtaining an
acceptable vision about system performance.
6.1 Recommendation for Improvement
In order to improve the wireless SIS the following recommendations can be helpful:
• Since the major failure root are back to error in defining the protocol, it is important to
utilize professional programmers who are aware of different failures and consequences in
addition to programming skills.
• To improve reliability by using redundant access point and network manager (the new
version of the wireless gas detector has redundant access point and network managers).
• Before applying the safety system into field operation, performing a test can be helpful for
debugging of network protocol.
• Location of sensors and access points is very important. Training and experience of crew
that design and perform installation is therefore important.
• Improving process safety time and elimination of delays in sensing (e.g. by improving
battery lifetime)
• Monitoring the environment in order to prevent the interference from other devices.
• It is important to be aware of installing a new wireless network in vicinity of the wireless
SIS would affect the QoS of wireless SIS.
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6.2 Further Research
However, this study skipped some aspects of the wireless SIS due to limitations. Investigation
on the following topics would be of the interests of industries and appliers:
• Dependency analysis among different jumps in the wireless SIS
• Analysis on recovery and maintenance for different packet-loss rate of WSN
• Experiment on effects of climate change on QoS of wireless SIS
• Investigation on the other QoS metrics for WSN modeling such as latency
• Simulating the sensors in a WSN according to latency and packet-loss rate
• Investigation on the reliability modeling of WSN with different voting group(koon) in wire-
less SIS
Appendix A
Acronyms
ACK Acknowledgment
DARPA Defense advanced research project agency
DD Dangerous and detected
DU Dangerous and undetected
DSN Distributed sensor network
DTU Down time unavailability
EUC Equipment under control
FMECA Failure modes, effect, and criticality analysis
HCF HART communication foundation
ISA International society of automation
MAC Medium access control
PFD Probability of failure on demand
PHY Physical layer
QoS Quality of service
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RAMS Reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety
RIF Reliability influencing factor
SIF Safety instrumented function
SIL Safety integrity level
SIS Safety instrumented system
TDMA Time division multiple access
WLAN Wireless local area network
WSN Wireless sensor network
Appendix B
Additional Information
B.1 Markov Diagram GRIF-Markov Module
Figure B.1: Markov Diagram in GRIF-Markov Module (rates are per hrs)
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